|
Packing a Biological Punch
Could the U.S. beef industry be targeted by
bioterrorists?
By Kristen Tribe
|
Timeline |
| 1915 - 1916 - German agents targeted horses and mules in Maryland, Virginia and New York with anthrax and
glanders. They also targeted horses, sheep and other livestock in Romania with
glanders.
1915 - 1918 - German agents targeted horses and cattle in Spain.
1916 - German agents targeted Norway's reindeer and cattle with anthrax and possibly
glanders.
1916 - 1917 - German agents targeted horses, mules and possibly cattle in Argentina.
1917 - German agents targeted horses in France with
glanders.
1925 - The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was established banning biological, toxin and chemical weapons. The treaty does not ban their development or storage and contained no provisions for compliance.
1930s -1940s - Japan developed a biological weapons project, Unit 731 and used the weapons against China and Manchuria.
1941 - U.K. is the first western nation to organize an offensive biological weapons program.
1940s - 1960s - United States and Canada developed both offensive and defensive biological weapons programs.
1948 - Congress mandates that studies of rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease be conducted on an island setting, thus Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
1952 - Cattle in Kenya were attacked by the Mau Mau freedom fighters with a plant toxin.
1969 - President Nixon abolishes U.S. program.
1972 - The Biological Weapons Convention says any agreeing parties will not develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins that have no justification for peaceful purposes or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes in armed conflict.
1973 - Biopreparat was established and designed to support research and production of bioweapons targeting humans for the Soviet program.
1978 - 1980 - Rhodesian security forces may have used anthrax against Rhodesian cattle.
1982 - 1984 - The Soviet military may have used glanders against Afghanistan horses.
1991 - Soviet Union's biological weapons program dissolved.
1997 - New Zealand farmers exposed wild rabbits in New Zealand to viral hemorrhagic disease of rabbits, classified as a biological crime.
Compiled from Emerging Animal Diseases. |
In recent years, bioterrorism hasn't meant more to the United States than a few bad movies, but a growing biotechnology industry has put the necessary scientific knowledge and equipment in more hands than ever before. Couple that with the current prevalence of foreign animal diseases, and you've got a bioterrorism spin-off -
"agroterrorism."
Defined on the FBI's web site as "an attack against agriculture, livestock or other food supplies with a biological, chemical or radiological weapon," agroterrorism has gained the attention of government agencies and farmers and ranchers across the country.
"You can measure vulnerability and the intelligence community can learn something about threat. But we know very little about risk or likelihood," says Dr. David Franz, vice president, chemical and biological defense division, Southern Research Institute, Frederick, Md.
If it's any reassurance, the FBI says U.S. agriculture has never actually been attacked. But in 1984, the Bagwan Shree Rajneessh cult targeted the food supply by spraying salmonella on salad bars in several restaurants in Dalles, Ore., causing 751 people to become ill and making this the most significant attack to date.
For the beef industry, the biggest bioterrorist threat is the intentional introduction of foot-and-mouth-disease. Any outbreak, intentional or naturally occurring, would be like a punch in the stomach to beef cattle producers, knocking the wind out of the industry.
The threat
Since 1995, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), "those primarily dealing with threatened use or procurement of chemical, biological or radiological materials with intent to harm," have shown a steady increase, according to the FBI.
In 1999, the bureau made a congressional statement on the "Threatened Use and Possession of Biological Agents," microbes or toxins used in a bioterrorist attack to produce illness or death. It said that WMD cases have steadily increased, from 37 cases in 1996 to 74 cases in 1997, 22 of which were related to biological agents. In 1998 there were 181 cases - 112 related to biological agents. Of the 123 cases in 1999, 100 were related to biological agents.
These include cases related to both human and agricultural attacks, and although Hollywood often targets humans with biological weapons on the big screen, many scientists believe crops and livestock may be at a bigger risk today.
Dr. Mark Wheelis, professor at the University of California - Davis and member of the Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification, says that for one, an animal attack is actually easier than an attack on humans.
According to Wheelis:
1. Most agents effective for animals aren't harmful to humans.
2. Delivery systems are readily available and unsophisticated.
3. The maximum effect might only require a few cases.
4. Delivery from an outside target country is possible.
5. An attack can be constructed to appear normal.
Wheelis also brings out a good point that the moral barriers to bioterrorism against agriculture are much lower. In other words, a potential terrorist may find it easier to swallow the lump in his throat if he's targeting animals and not the human race.
Besides, human bioterrorism requires more technical knowledge and access to deadly microbial strains. Biological weapons used against agriculture are often more accessible and some can be obtained in regions where they're endemic, or native.
This is why foot-and-mouth-disease has become such a serious threat. Being so contagious, or easily transmissible, the industry was worried about tourists carrying it back unknowingly. How far-fetched is it to think someone might bring it back intentionally?
Other diseases that could pose a threat for the American animal industry include rinderpest, avian flu, classical swine fever, African swine fever, African horse sickness, Newcastle disease, sheep and goat pox, hog cholera and vesicular stomatitis, among others.
Wheelis says consequences of an attack would range from the actual death loss of animals to indirect effects, such as market destabilization and losses to processors or shipping companies. The fallout of an attack might also involve restrictions on trade and the loss of killing merely exposed animals in an effort to contain the outbreak.
Managing an emergency
The International Office of Epizootics keeps track of international diseases and maintains two lists - List A and List B. List A is comprised of diseases of the greatest concern, more highly contagious diseases, and List B is made up of secondary diseases.
Member countries must report a List A disease to the office immediately. Then in turn, all the other member countries will be alerted and can take proper precautions. This office also coordinates studies at the international level for surveillance and control of animal diseases.
In the United States, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's Veterinary Service emergency program would coordinate a national effort among other national agencies, private veterinarians and livestock producers against a foreign animal disease.
The APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine staff monitors activity by working inspection sites at U.S. borders and ports of entry, and the Agricultural Research Service is responsible for vaccines and diagnostics. Although duties are seemingly handled by one national agency, universities, state veterinarians and even the FBI are getting more involved in emergency response plans.
"In the past, most of the intelligence community was concerned with human biological warfare or human bioterrorism," says Franz, "but the FBI and other communities are thinking a lot about agriculture these days." For FY 2002, the FBI requested increases totaling $32,059,000 and 42 positions (8 agents) to improve and enhance existing counter-terrorism capabilities and operations.
Dr. Linda Logan, executive director, Texas Animal Health Commission, says they are concerned about infectious animal diseases and are prepared for what are considered to be the most important foreign animal diseases. She stresses that it really doesn't matter how a disease gets to this country - we must be prepared to eradicate it.
In March, Gov. Rick Perry added TAHC to the State Emergency Management Council and mandated that a plan be put together to deal with animal disease emergencies, hence the Foreign Animal Disease Working Group. More than 30 state agencies are members and there is a Stakeholders Advisory Group that includes all major livestock industry organizations in Texas to provide input and be part of the planning process.
"USDA and TAHC work hand-in-hand on most animal disease issues in Texas," says Dr. Keith Armstrong, USDA assistant veterinarian in charge. "This is the first time ever that state resources were made available to use in a foreign animal disease outbreak plan, though."
READEO, the Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization, is the U.S. Department of Agriculture's national response organism - a 38-person team on call for the immediate control and eradication of foreign animal diseases. Armstrong says TAHC tried to merge the READEO principles and tactics with that of the Texas Department of Emergency Management.
Dr. Logan says by joining forces with the Department of Emergency Management, they can draw on their technical expertise, equipment and manpower statewide, but even with the obvious advantages of working together, the planning process started rather slowly.
"With a hurricane or tornado, (problems the Department of Emergency Management is more accustomed to) there's an awful lot of debris, down trees, torn up houses and wrecked cars," says Dr. Ken Waldrup, TAHC veterinarian. "With FMD, we've got another major disposal issue, and that's a whole lot of carcasses. So there was some common ground, on at least where to get started. . . . We just had to see if we could work, grind the gears and pop the clutch for some of them."
The FAD working group held an exercise to test their emergency response plan June 25-29, 2001, in College Station, Texas, to test the infrastructure and plans they've made so far.
"I want to give a lot of credit to the state Emergency Management Department because they have worked long and hard with us," Waldrup says. "And that was the first exercise in the history of the United States to do that." Waldrup goes on to say that following the exercise, Texas is definitely more prepared for a foreign animal disease outbreak and many states are "following on our heels."
Some groups, like Texas Cattle Feeders Association, have established their own safety task force and developed written safety guidelines that their members may use.
"On one hand, you don't want to be paranoid; but on the other hand, you don't want to stick your head in the sand either," says Waldrup. "And it's trying to find the good, common ground in there that will help you without hurting you."
No matter what plans are in place, Waldrup stresses that you and your local veterinarian are actually the first line of defense. He says TAHC and Veterinary Services are actually about third down on the list because cattle producers and local veterinarians carry the initial responsibility to report any "symptoms" that could indicate a foreign animal disease.
Naturally, areas of more intensive production are at greater risk. But you also have to consider if FMD hit East or South Texas feral hogs and deer would be a concern because they would probably help the disease spread at an even faster rate. But the possibilities are endless, and you can't prepare for every scenario.
"It's impossible to know where they'd strike because no matter how you prepare, it would be somewhere else," Logan says.
The attackers
The CIA reports that at least 10 countries are believed to possess or be conducting research on biological agents for weaponization. Weaponization means taking a disease or biological toxin and putting it in a form that can be widely dispersed, such an aerosol or airborne particles.
Although the technical know-how may be more accessible these days, biological weapons aren't new. Logan says there is actually scientific literature pertaining to agroterrorism, biological crimes and biological warfare targeting livestock and poultry dating back nearly 90 years.
(See the sidebar: Peering into the past)
"It's necessary to sort of think out of the usual terrorist box. We may be talking about people within the industry, possibly in competing countries or corporations," Wheelis says, "or possibly disgruntled individuals who can do a great deal of harm."
In Emerging Animal Diseases, Dr. Logan and co-authors of Chapter 3, Terrance Wilson, Richard Weller and Barry Kellman, say that everyone can be a threat - traditional, state-sponsored actors; rogue states; extremist groups; organized crime; militia groups; anti-abortionists or animal rights activists.
But again, the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack actually happening is not easy to determine.
" . . . there's a heightened awareness with the public," says Armstrong. "(USDA) has been doing [foreign animal disease eradication] since day one and I see no reason why our mission would change. And the exercises we do periodically, just to keep ourselves sharp, will continue to happen. They happen without much fanfare. We usually don't get a lot of press. There's not much heightened awareness in the USDA because our awareness is at top-level all the time."
Keeping it in perspective
Dr. Franz recounts the nuclear threat when he was in grade school - and it never happened. But in preparation, stockpiles of canned water, canned crackers and candy were kept in 5-gallon cans and were stored in basements of office buildings and in air raid shelters.
When Franz joined the Army in 1971, part of his job was to inspect air raid shelters - those that were still around.
"I found these cans had been pushed out of the way and the water cans had rusted through, allowing all the water to escape," he recounts. "The crackers were intact because they tasted like cardboard and the candy - it was gone about as far down as you can reach with your hand. Symbolically, that's something we need to think about, in regard to terrorism here.
"The risk is totally unknown and probably pretty low," he concludes, "but the potential impact is enormous. Terrorism preparedness money spent on public health, or in this case preparation for the natural introduction of foreign animal diseases, is money well spent."
|
Sidebar:
Peering into the past |
| Although technology may have made bioterrorism a more viable force today, the threat has always been lurking in the shadows.
Dr. Linda Logan, executive director, Texas Animal Health Commission, wrote Chapter 3, "Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture" for the book Emerging Animal Health Diseases, along with Terrance Wilson, Richard Weller and Barry
Kellman.
According to their work, there are publications dating back to 1952 concluding that targeting livestock and poultry would be easy and would require only a low level of scientific and technical skills to perpetrate.
Prior to 1970, many countries maintained biological weapons programs but Germany perhaps used more than most others. Known to have used anthrax and glanders against cattle, sheep, horses and reindeer in Romania, Spain, France, Norway, Argentina and the United States during World War I, Logan says this anti-livestock program was the first national biological warfare program and the first one with a scientific foundation.
By 1941, the United Kingdom set up an offensive biological weapons program. And sometime between the late 1940s and 1960s, the United States and Canada followed suit by developing both offensive and defensive programs. At one point, two anti-livestock and anti-poultry viruses were field-tested by the U.S. military, and hog cholera was weaponized in 1951. But in 1969, the U.S. offensive program was abolished.
"The Russians didn't believe that we were stopping in 1969," says Logan. "They thought we were going underground and escalating the program."
Logan says she was shocked to find out how extensive the Russian program was until its dissolution in 1991. When Logan worked for Agricultural Research Service, she met Ken Alibek, a defected employee of the Soviet program and former deputy chief of research for Biopreparat, the organization that developed biological weapons to use against humans.
"Shortly after that, I was asked to go to Russia and help them set up a new program with state department money to redirect bioweapons research scientists into peacetime operations," she says. "I came to discover that in the former Soviet Union they had at least 10,000 people in anti-agriculture pathogen development."
Following the breakup of the program, government funding for research decreased dramatically, leaving many Russian scientists, like Alibek, with biological weapons knowledge, out of a job.
About the same time the Russian program was dissolved, Iraq confirmed that animals and agricultural crops were targets of bioweapon development and weaponization. But there is no public evidence that they used them in the Gulf War.
These are just a few "highlights" in the history of bioweapons and biological warfare. You may now realize that the list of suspected and actual bioterrorist incidents is too long to list, but let's hope it doesn't hit close to home again anytime soon.
You can learn more about the
Soviet Union's biological weapons
program in Ken Alibek's book, Biohazard. |
|